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ABSTRACT
Determinants of CEO Compensation in the Hospitality Industry
by
Yoonhwa Choi
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Conunittee Chair 
Associate Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The issue of top management compensation has received widespread attention 
from public concerns, stockholders, and regulating agencies for many years. Research on 
top management compensation has taken place for more than 70 years. Recent popular 
literature has criticized the compensation awarded to the Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) of large companies, claiming that pay is excessive and is not adequately linked to 
firm performance. Hospitality industry is not an exception for such criticism. However, 
little research on hospitality CEO compensation itself has been done.
This study empirically investigated whether CEO pay is linked to company 
performance within the hospitality industry, and attempted to further identify 
determinants of executive compensation among selected variables used in this study for 
the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors. Thus, the present study adds to the body of
ui
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knowledge on executive compensation for the hospitality industry by newly identifying 
sector-specific variables.
The data was gathered for the years 1995-2000 for 22 hotels (SIC 7011), 25 
casinos (SIC 7990), and 61 restaurants (SIC 5812) respectively. The final samples of the 
restaurant, hotel and casino sectors consisted of 53, 77, and 188 observations 
respectively.
This study found that the results of regression analysis at least partially support 
agency theory in the hotel, casino and restaurant sectors by demonstrating that some 
variables of ûrm performance are highly correlated with CEO compensation with the 
high-adjusted R Square of .756, .727, and .697 respectively. The study's findings also 
suggest that : (1) there is a strong relationship between firm size and CEO compensation; 
(2) CEO compensation in the hotel and restaurant sectors demonstrates its high sensitivity 
to a Arm's leverage condition; (3) hotel CEOs with high cash compensation are more 
likely sales revenue than proAt-oriented; (4) there is an indicadon of agency problem in 
the hotel sector by illustraüng that hotel Arms pay high compensaAon despite poor 
market performance of their stocks.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Study 
Is CEO compensation linked to firm performance? The issue of top management 
compensation is of key interest, not only to academic researchers, but also individuals 
and entides including (for example) stockholders and regulating agencies, such as those 
responsible for implementing new tax laws.
Pioneering work by Jensen and Meckhng (1976) suggests corporations should provide 
compensation packages to attract and retain management talent, while simultaneously 
balancing such compensaAon with expected increases in shareholder wealth resulting 
from management performance. As long as execuAve pay is determined by performance 
that increases shareholders' wealth, shareholders should jusAfy high execuAve pay.
RafGo (1997) reports that the industry's 100 highest paid leaders averaged an 
impressive 60% increase in total compensaAon (cash and long-term rewards) of $1.5 
nullion. In contrast, economists say most average workers wrangled no more than a 3-5 
% pay hike during 1996, with foodservice at the low end of that range, hourly wages 
creeping up an average of only 3.2%. Unit managers received salaries typically in the 
$27000-$35000 range.
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Initially, corporations had been allowed to voluntarily disclose their own respective 
(direct and indirect) forms of executive compensation. Publicly held companies are now 
required, however, to file proxy statements with the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in order to officially address the issue of alleged excessive CEO compensation. 
These disclosures serve to give a potenhal investor enough information about a company 
to determine what their making an investment in the company is worthwhile 
(Romanchek, 1999). As a result of public outcry over CEO compensation, congress took 
a significant step towards reforming execuAve pay in 1993. The government 
implemented a new tax law, 162(m) stating that any cash paid to an executive in excess 
of $1 million is non-tax deductible unless the salaries or bonuses are based on clearly 
articulated performance goals (Romanchek, 1999; Dennis-EscofAer, 2001 ).
Some studies suggest, however, that CEO compensation is not always tied to a Arm's 
performance. CEOs are paid well not only when their work yields posiAve results, but 
indeed, even when they fail to achieve good results (Behr, 1997).
The principal-agent model of executive compensation suggests that by connecting pay 
to performance, shareholders ensure corporate managers aAempt to maximize shareholder 
wealth (Jensen & Meckling 1976). There are times, however, when respective interests 
of shareholders and managers are incongruent. thus creating agency costs for 
shareholders. Past research has aAempted to determine the opAmal conAact for both 
pnncipal and agent, and has focused, to that end, on contractual relations between owners 
and managers (Beatty &  Zajac 1994; Eisenhardt 1989; Harris &  Raviv 1979; Shavell 
1979).
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Purpose of the Study 
One key objective of this study is to investigate whether CEO pay is linked to 
company performance within the hospitality industry. This questionable link between 
pay and performance is directly addressed by examining the relationship between Arm 
performance and CEO cash compensation. Another objective of the study is to examine 
determinants of executive compensation among selected variables used in this study for 
the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors.
The issue of judging one accounting measure equally important across all Arms 
regardless of industry has already been identiAed as a weakness of previous studies (Duru 
& Iyengar, 1999; Lobingier, 2000). This study, then, focuses on sector-speciAc 
determinants across three sectors of the hospitality industry: hotel, casino, and restaurant. 
Therefore, the issue is avoided by expanding variables with diverse aspects that may be 
speciAcally related to CEO compensation across three separate sectors of the hospitality 
industry.
Contributions of the Study 
Potenhal conhibuAons of the study are:
1. Despite numerous studies of executive compensation conducted over the last 
70 years, the review of literature in the area of execuAve compensation does 
not indicate that pnor academic research has been done speciAcally for the 
hospitality industry. Therefore, this study will both provide empincal 
evidence and contribute to the body of research on the topic of executive 
compensation for the comprehensive hospitality industry.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2. This study will help boards of directors and compensation consultants to 
structure opAmal CEO compensation contracts by providing sector speciAc- 
relevant compensaAon determinants for each sector examined.
3. This study compensates for weakness in previous studies using only one 
accounting measure across all firms, regardless of industry (Duru & Iyengar. 
1999; Lobingier, 2000) by expanding the spectrum of variables of Anancial 
ratios. The present study also adds to the body of knowledge on execuAve 
compensaAon for the hospitality industry by newly idenAfying sector-speciAc 
variables.
4. This study expands the Ame Aame to six years. By using mulAple-year 
observations (Attaway, 2000; Lobingier, 2000; Joyce, 2001) of sample Arms' 
relevant accounting data Aom 1995 to 2000, the current study is expected to 
provide a supenor gauge of CEO performance, since multi-year observaAons 
are less sensitive to transitory occurrences than are single-year observations 
(Newman & Bannister, 1998: Mishra & Nielsen, 1999:Ueng, 2000).
LimitaAons of the Study
1. In this study, the sample is limited to publicly traded hotel, casino, and 
restaurant Arms. Privately held companies are excluded due to lack of 
available Anancial data.
2. ExecuAve compensation is limited to short-term pay, consisting of cash 
bonuses and salaries. This study does not use stock as a compensation 
component, since AAeen percent of the companies used in the sample failed to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Ale copies of employee stock plans as exhibits of the Form 10-K annual 
reports required by the SEC (Brown, 2000). Therefore, using stock 
compensation would interfere with this study's overall accuracy. Another 
reason for using cash compensaAon only is for easy comparability with 
previous studies of different indusAies. Most earlier studies ( Agarwal. 1981 ; 
Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Aggarwal & Samwick. 1999: Attaway. 2000 ; 
Joyce, 2001) have also used cash compensaAon alone. This study does not 
investigate deferred forms of compensaAon, either, such as stock options and 
other long deferred compensaAon forms. Past studies (Lewellen & Huntsman, 
1970) have determined cash compensation (salary plus bonus) an acceptable 
substitute for more comprehensive measures of compensation.
3. ExecuAve compensation examined for this study is that of CEOs only.
4. A limitation associated with this study is the accuracy of the data because the 
study has to rely on available secondary data.
5. Results of the study cannot be generalized across industries since the study 
investigates only the hospitality industry.
6. CEO personal factors are not considered within this study. These include age, 
job tenure, stock ownership, and education.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DeAniAon of Terms
1. Regression Analysis: Regression analysis is a staAsAcai technique that can he used to 
develop a mathematical equation showing how variables are related.
2. Dependent Variable: Dependent variable also called consequent variable or cnterion 
variable. It is the vanable that is thought inAuenced by other variables.
3. Independent Variable: Independent variable is also called antecedent variable or 
predictor variable. It is the variable thought to inAuence other vanables.
4. The R square of the multiple correlaAon coefAcient (R^): R" is a Goodness-of-At 
measure of a linear model, sometimes called the coefAcient of determination. It is the 
proportion of variaAon in the dependent variable explained by the regression model.
It ranges in value Aom 0 to 1. Small values indicate that the model does not At the 
data well.
5. The multiple correlation coefAcient (R ): R is a Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefAcient between the cntenon variable and the predicted score on the critenon 
variable.
6. Deferred compensation: This includes pension beneAts, deferred pay, stock options, 
stock bonuses, IRAs, and proAt sharing.
7. Cash compensation: This is deAned as the sum of annual salary and bonus, all 
measured in thousands of dollars (Rajagopalan &  PrescoA, 1990)
8. Backward Elimination: This is variable selection procedure in which all vanables are 
entered into the equation, and then sequentially removed. If  it meets the cntenon for 
elimination, it is removed. AAer the Arst vanable is removed, the remaining vanable 
within the equation having the smallest partial correlation is next considered. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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procedure ends when there are no further variables in the equation that satisfy 
removal criteria.
9. Lodeine/Hotel industry: A group of firms deAned by SIC code 7011 as commercial 
establishments engaged in providing lodging for the general public.
10. Casino industry: A group of Arms deAned by SIC code 7990 as commercial 
establishments engaged in gaming.
11. Restaurant industry: A group of Arms deAned by SIC code 5812 as commercial 
establishments primarily engaged in retail sales of prepared food and dnnks for on­
premise or immediate consumption.
12. Liquidity rahos: Financial ratios used to indicate a firm's ability to meet short-term 
Anancial obligations.
13. Leverage ratios: Financial ratios used to measure the extent to which a Arm relies on 
borrowed funds.
14. ProAtability ratios: Financial ratios used to reAect a Arm's ability to cover costs and 
provide returns to Arm owners.
15. EfAciency raAos: Financial ratios used to measure producAvity for a given level of 
input.
16. Quick raAo (OR): This measures a Arm's liquidity, and may be obtained by dividing 
quick assets by current liabilities.
17. Long term liabiliAes to total assets (LTD ): This is a leverage ratio, computed by 
dividing long-term liabilities by total assets.
18. Net pro At margin (NPM ): This is a proAtability ratio obtainable by dividing net 
pro At by net sales.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
s
19. Total asset turnover (ATT): This is an efAciency ratio, computed by dividing net 
sales by the average of the current year's and the prior year's total assets.
20. 1 Year stock return (SR): This is a one-year percentage change in stock returns.
21. Return on assets (ROA): This means income before exAaordinary items available 
for common, divided by total assets.
22. Return on investment (ROD: This is income before extraordinary items- available 
for common, divided by total invested capital.
23. 1 Year sales growth rate (SG): This is one-year percentage change of total sales.
24. EBITDA interest coverage (IC ): It is computed by dividing earnings before interest 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) by interests.
Organization of the Study 
This study is designed to empirically investigate whether CEO pay is linked to 
company performance within the hospitality industry, and to attempt to further identify 
determinants of executive compensation among selected variables used in this study for 
the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors. Chapter 1 discusses the background of the study, 
including its purpose, contributions, limitations, and provides a list of deAnition of terms. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on CEO compensaAon. Chapter 3 discusses data, 
variables, and research methodologies used in the study. Chapter 4 states Andings of the 
empincal investigaAon and analyzes results. Chapter 5 discusses results and implicaAons 
of the study, as well as providing suggestions for further research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
InAoducdon
Tremendous studies on executive compensaAon have been conducted over last 70 
years. Chapter 2 will present extensive aspects of execuAve compensaAon that were 
researched across industries by previous studies, including types of executive 
compensaAon, agency theory, firm size as related to execuAve compensaAon, 
compensaAon/ firm performance relaAonship, Anancial raAos used as proxies of Arm 
performance, and execuAve compensaAon in the hospitality industry.
Types of CompensaAon 
Short-term compensaAon 
Short-term (or total cash) compensaAon is deAned as the sum of the annual salary and 
bonus. Agarwal (1981) stated that the largest percentage of pnor studies have deAned 
execuAve compensaAon to include orAy direct cash payments; thus cash compensation 
has the advantage of providing comparability with other studies of execuAve 
compensaAon. Also, Lewellen & Huntsman (1970) indicated that using salary and bonus 
as a measure of executive compensaAon is an acceptable substitute for a more 
comprehensive measure. To normalize this vanable and avoid biases caused by ouAiers,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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some previous studies have used the natural logarithm of CEO salary plus bonuses 
(Attaway. 2000).
Long-term compensation 
Long-term compensation includes a wide array of deferred compensaAon beneAts. like 
stock options, IRAs, bonus deferrals, pensions, and proAt sharing. (Gomez-Mejia. Tosi. 
& Hinkin, 1987). Stock options can be used to augment salaries with a call option, so 
that a CEO's total compensation pattern is more like that of a shareholder. Miller & 
Scholes (1982) suggest stock options can be a more efAcient form of compensation.
Thus. CEO common stock is used to offset the incentive to manipulate annual earnings. 
However, valuaAon of long-term incentives is beset with a number of practical and 
methodological issues (Kerr &  BeAis, 1987; Finkelstein & Hambnck, 1989).
Agency Theory
The relationship predicted to exist between Arm performance and executive pay is 
rooted in agency theory. Agency theory has been a major theoretical Aamework for 
researching CEO compensation in numerous previous studies. Pnor empirical research 
has generally focused on pay-perfbrmance sensiAvity, under the assumption that an 
optimal CEO conAact should closely link pay to performance, since CEO behavior is 
largely unobservable.
Baker. Jensen & Murphy (1988) discuss aspects of compensation using two distinct 
approaches to viewing compensation: (1) Aaditional economic theory, and (2) 
uneconomic theory. Typical explanations offered by psychologists, behaviorists, human 
resource consultants, and personnel executives are distinctly uneconomic, that is.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and 
culture. Expectancy theoiy and determinants of organizational performance are examples 
of uneconomic theory components. The major theoretical framework for researching 
CEO pay derives Aom economics, however, and has been captured within the notion of 
agency theory. The challenge to economists is to either provide viable economic 
explanations for these pracAces or integrate alternative notions into the Aaditional 
economic model.
According to agency theory, an agency problem exists when an agent, such as a CEO, 
has established an agenda at odds with stockholder interests. Therefore, one way to avoid 
agency problems in the short-run is to reward executives based on Anancial returns to 
shareholders (Kerr &  BetAs, 1989; Martocchio, 1998).
In terms of CEO compensation, the standard agency model (Holmstrom, 1979) 
implies that a CEO of sAonger ability has a greater reservation level of utility due to 
favorable outside job opportunities and, thus, requires greater compensaAon. It is 
expected that (to the extent CEO ability associates with Arm performance) CEO 
compensation w ill vary according to CEO performance.
Agency theory posits that a conAact exists between agent (management) and pnncipal 
(shareholder), and that actions by an agent may be best monitored through use of 
incentives that link goals of the agent to those of the pnncipal. This theory also 
emphasizes the idea that managers are self-serving; therefore, formal mechanisms, i.e., 
monitonng and reward structures, serve to align incentives of top managers with interests 
of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama 1980; Jensen, 1983). The main
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
objective of boards of directors, then, should be to structure incentives so that an agent's 
goal of increased personal wealth is not reached at the expense of shareholder w ealth.
Much of the conceptual literature based on an agency framework offers the argument 
that principals have two options for reducing agency costs arising Aom conAicts of 
interest and/or self-serving behaviors on the part of agents. The Arst is to purchase 
information about the agents' efforts; the second is to link incentives to agents' outcomes 
(i.e., performance).
Firm Size and Executive CompensaAon 
Previous empincal studies generally And a sAong relationship between Arm size and 
executive pay. Two commonly used proxies for Arm size are sales volume (Jensen &  
Murphy. 1988; Newman & Bannister, 1998) and Arm's total assets (Baumol. 1959: 
Marris. 1963; Sndharan. 1996; Ueng, 2000).
Jensen and Murphy (1988) suggest that the compensaAon/sales elasticity for Ave years 
and for Ave industry groups has been remarkably stable across Ame and industnes. 
Moreover, the correlaAon between size and compensation is very high.
Murphy (1988) shows that when holding the value of the Arm constant, a Arm whose 
sales grow by 10 percent will increase the salary and bonus of its CEO by between 2 and 
3 percent. This Anding suggests size/pay relaAon is causal, and therefore reAects more 
than a matching of CEOs to Arms on the basis of their abilities. It also suggests CEOs 
can increase their pay by increasing Arm size, even when an increase in size reduces a 
Arm's market value.
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Tosi et al. (1996) And that Arm size accounts for 54 percent of variance in CEO pa\. 
Sridharan (1996) suggests a positive relationship between CEO compensations and the 
book value of a Arm's assets. Baumol (1959) and Marris (1963) And that managers are 
motivated to increase corporate power, conAol. and perks by maximizing a Arm's size.
While most studies to date have examined only large companies, Ueng (2000) 
examines determinants of CEO pay for small as well as large Arms. Evidence in this 
study suggests that CEO pay in large Arms is mostly a function of CEO inAuence over 
the board of directors, as well as Arm size and performance. Firm size is a pnmary factor 
in determining CEO pay within small Arms.
Compensation/ Firm Performance RelaAonship and Financial Ratios 
Research on top management compensaAon over the past 70 years has yielded more 
than 300 studies (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman. 1997). Among these, the most Aequently 
researched topic has been the relationship between CEO compensaAon and Arm 
performance. A positive relationship between CEO compensaAon and Arm performance 
would be consistent with agency theory, the dominant paradigm in this sAeam of research 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998). Studies examining the relationship between 
performance-based compensation components and improved firm performance that have 
been measured using accounting variables have produced conAicting results.
Some studies have shown that accounAng-based compensation components motivate 
managers to make decisions that increase their own wealth, but that do not improve Arm 
performance (Healy, 1985: Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Lambert &  Larker, 1987). Other 
studies have shown a signiAcant relationship between improvements in accounting
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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variables and increased executive compensation (Ely. 1991; Avowd. 1990; Duru & 
Iyengar. 1999; Joyce. 2001). Despite conAicting results among past studies, companies 
continue to use accounting based measures of performance in compensation conAacts 
(Mercer et al.. 1997). Greater usage of accounting-based performance measures ma) be 
seen in future compensation contracts.
Regarding accounting measures of performance used in execuAve compensation 
literature, however, many scholars have pointed out a common weakness: most such 
studies studies have considered only one accounting measure of performance, and have 
viewed this measure as equally important across Arms (Duru & Iyengar, 1999; Lobingier. 
2000).
In the following section, empincal evidence Aom both sAong and weak relationship 
studies is presented. Accounting measures of performance and other conAol measures 
are also descnbed. Scholars typically use proAtability, stock performance, or 
stockholders equity to measure company performance (Dyl. 1988; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia. 
1994). ProAtability is usually measured as EPS or ROA. Stock performance is usually 
measured by changes in stock prices. Stockholder's equity (ROE) is oAen used as a 
measure of company performance. The annual return on assets (ROA) is used to measure 
the performance of each individual year within the sample.
Duru and Iyengar (1999) investigate the association between a broad specAum of Arm 
performance measures and CEO compensation components for the elecAic utility 
industry. They adopt market returns (SR); return on assets (ROA); earnings per share 
(EPS); operaAng cash Aow per share and growth in sales (SG). Results of their study
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
suggest a positive association between changes in compensation and changes in Arm 
performance.
Agrawal (1991) analyzed effects of pooled time-senes cross-sectional regressions of 
growth in compensation on performance measures, and found cash compensation 
positively related to both shareholder return and sales growth. Joyce (2001) researched 
executive compensation and Arm performance for a sample of publicly traded banks and 
savings and loans. Joyce used ROA and CEO individual related variables including 
tenure and stock ownership. Results of this study indicate a positive correlation between 
compensation and ROA and CEO individual related variables. Lobingier (2000) 
examined the relaAonship between Arst-time performance plan adoption and Arm 
performance, measured over 20 years across 9 industry groups. As a general 
performance measure, ROE is applied to all 9 industries, and industry-speciAc measures 
used for each. Results indicate industry-speciAc measures provide more sensitive 
measurements of Arm performance than do general performance measures.
Newman & Bannister (1998) examine corporate compensation structures by 
invesAgating how the ratio of CEO compensation to average non-CEO employee 
compensation varies across Arms/ industries. The ratio is found to vary with 
performance. Arm size, and the industiy itself. This study employs ROE and stock 
market return (SR) to measure Arm performance, and uses the log of sales as a measure 
of size. Ueng (2000) examines impacts of CEO inAuence over boards of directors on 
CEO pay for large and small Arms. Additionally, other determinants of CEO pay for 
large and small Arms are examined using ROA, SG (growth rate in sales), and TA 
(LOGAST, the natural logarithm of a Arm's total assets). Results suggest CEO inAuence
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over boards of directors regarding CEO pay is the key factor within larger Arms, and that 
Arm size itself is the pnmary determinant within smaller ones.
Other researchers, using different sets of data, measurements of variables, statistical 
techniques, and model speciAcations have oAen found weak or even statistically 
insigniAcant relaAonships, however, between pay and performance (Jensen & Murphy. 
1990). Hirschey & Pappas (1981), for instance. And a negative association between 
accounting income and CEO cash compensation. And Ciscel (1977) discovers a weak 
correlation between cash compensaAon and both sales and proAts. Garen (1994) 
reinforces the idea of the insigniAcance of this relaAonship by noting that the overall 
explanatory power of the empincal model for pay-perfbrmance sensitivity is low.
More recently, in a factor analysis of execuAve compensation literature, Tosi. Werner, 
Katz & Gomez-Mejia (1998) fbund that less than 5 percent of CEO pay appeared to be 
explainable by performance factors.
The table below summarizes Anancial ratios used in previous studies on the 
relationship between CEO compensaAon and Arm performance. These financial ratios 
served as the basis for the selecAon of ratios used in this study.
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Table 1.
Financial Ratios Used in Previous Studies
Variable Studies
ROA ( return of total assets) Jensen and Murphy (1990), C. Joe Ueng (2000)
ROI( return of total investment) Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987)
ROE (return of shareholder's Lambert and Larker(1987). Abowd (1990). Traichal
equity) and Gallinger (1995).Jensen and Murphy (1990)
SR ( lyr change of stock return) Lewellen and Huntsman (1970). Goughian and
Schmidt (1985)
Kerr and Bettis (1987), Abowd (1990). Pavlik et al 
(1993), Schaefer (1998)
EPS ( earnings per share) Gomez-Mejia. Tosi, and Hinkin (1987)
SGR ( lyr sales growth rate) Sridharah (1996), Daryl N. Winn & John D.
Shoenhair(1988)
Baumol( 1959 ), Masson (1971). Patricia G Lobingier 
(2000)
IT  ( inventory turnover) Patricia G Lobingier (2000)
TA ( total assets) Baumol (1959), Marris (1963), Tosi, et al (1996)
_____________________________ Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997)_____________
Executive Compensation in the Hospitality Industry 
There has been criticism claiming excessive pay, unreasonable pay. and inordinate 
rising pay in relation to the issue of executive compensation across industries. Hospitality 
industry is not an exception for such criticism. However, it is said that the hospitality 
industry has long been labeled as one that pays its workers less than do other industries. 
Information regarding executive compensation packages also reveals that service 
industries provided the lowest average salary, short-term bonuses, and long-term bonuses 
among all the industries (Sturman, 2001). Recent study conducted by Sturman (2001) 
proves that overall pay is lower in the hospitality industry than in other industries. The 
result of his study demonstrates that the hospitality industry paid about the same as other 
industries for low-complexity jobs, but hospitality paid about 85 percent of what other
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industries paid for moderate-complexit)'jobs and 78 percent for high-complexit\' jobs 
including top executives.
Unlike in other industries, the academic research on the top executive compensation 
has not been conducted in the hospitality industry  ̂ However, there have been some non­
scholastic literatures on this topic. General trend on the executive compensation tor each 
sector in the hospitality industry is discussed in the fbllo^ving section.
Restaurant
Triarc, franchisor of the Arby's restaurant chain, paid CEO Nelson Peltz the princely 
sum of $25.2 million in 2000, including more than $15 million in restricted stock and 
long-term compensations. This package vaulted Peltz to the top of the heap in the 
restaurant world, up from No. 3 last year. Peltz's pay came to more than what the No.2 
executive. Tricon Global's David Novak, and No.3, McDonald's CEO Jack Greenberg, 
received combined.
Much criticism has been offered, however, of the awarding of such generous 
executive compensation packages (Kay, 1998). As that study suggests, not only are 
CEOs excessively compensated; they also enjoy inordinately high pay hikes compared to 
those of other, more average, workers.
Executive compensation consultant HVS conducted Restaurant Business's CEO 
compensation study using its "pay-fbr-perfbrmance" index (Mehegan, 1998). This 
system weighs compensation against company earnings, sales, stock prices, and other 
factors. I f  an executive scores 100, it means the person has earned his or her pay. Any 
score above 100 indicates executive performance above and beyond the call. A score 
below 100 suggests the CEO did not in fact earn his or her pay (Mehegan, 1998). O f 97
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executives surveyed by HVS, 48. or roughly half, scored over 100. a decline from the last 
year, when 57%of restaurant CEOs earned their keep Survey says..". 2001 ).
According to HVS 's 1998 survey of the 100 CEOs listed, only 33 had scores above the 
cut-off. i.e., 2/3 of CEOs for the biggest publicly traded restaurant companies in the 
country did not earn their pay (Mehegan, 1998).
Within the restaurant sector, stock options were the favored incentive-based 
compensation for corporate officers in the mid 1990s, since food service stocks were then 
favored on Wall Street. As a result, many small companies used option-heavj 
compensation packages to draw big-name executives ("Stock options: The favored 
incentive". 1993).
For example, Outback Steak is one of companies that made a successful debut during 
that time due to soaring stock prices. However, according to HVS VP Mansbach, stock 
options will be worth less in the future, since the restaurant sector has been out of favor 
on Wall Street since the mid 1990s (Mehegan, 2001). As a result, bonus incentives have 
become preferable options. The Hospitality Compensation Exchange study, conducted by 
HVS, further suggests that while stock options remain a long-term incentive to attract top 
executives, more restaurant companies are beehng up base salaries, bonuses and benefit 
packages to compete for all levels of talent (Berta, 2001). In other words, the structure of 
compensation is changing in the restaurant sector. Another reason for increased 
preference for bonuses over stock options is discussed in Restaurant Business ("Cash &  
cary", 2001): while stock option bonuses remain an effective way to keep officers 
around, it may take years for them to in fact pay off. Thus, boards, not wanting to risk 
waiting for options to vest, are looking for more immediate incentives and prizes.
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According to HVS, the executive compensation consultant, in a repeat of last year's 
trend, bonuses were the preferred method for rewarding and retaining CEOs of public 
companies. Cash incentives were up 18.4% year-over-year, while average salary rose 
4%. roughly in line with inflation. Values of stock-option grants, meanwhile, fell by 24% 
(Mehegan. 2001).
Casino
As within other industries, the issue of generous executive compensation within the 
casino sector raises questions about links between CEO compensation and company 
performance. Only a few decades ago, U.S. gaming had been restricted to Atlantic City, 
New Jersey, and to the state of Nevada. Today, however, 48 of 50 states within the U.S. 
allow some form of legalized gaming: as many as 21 states even offer Las Vegas style 
gaming experiences (Kefgen & Keung, 1999). Moreover, many of today 's casinos 
nationwide are complex webs of myriad entertainment options - hotels, gaming, 
restaurants, shows, and more (Kefgen & Mahoney, 1996).
With the unprecedented growth within this industry, combined with the new 
complexity of casino operation in and of itself, sophisticated and knowledgeable 
management teams have become crucial to financial success. In tum. upward pressure on 
executive compensation continues (Kefgen & Keung, 1999).
According to a 1997 HVS survey, gaming companies are taking steps to corral 
executive pay by tying compensation to company performance. That year, fifty-nine 
gaming CEOs met the criteria to be included in the survey, and were then tested by using 
its " pay-for-perfbrmance" index. Indices ranged from 1.4 to 206. TTiirty gaming CEOs 
ranked above the average rating of 100; 29 ranked below (Kefgen & Keung, 1997). The
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HVS survey also found that gaming executives out-earned their hotel and restaurant 
counterparts by almost 10%, and that executive perks in the casino sector was much more 
generous than those within the hotel and restaurant sectors (Kefgen & Mahone)', 1996). 
Goebel (2000) confirmed this finding in his article, stating that the general manager of a 
typical gaming property may expect to out earn his counterpart at a hotel by a significant 
margin. The general manager of a gaming operation doing between $2 and $50 million 
annually earns nearly 40% more than a general manager in a 250-500 room hotel. As 
sizes and revenues of the respective properties increase, differences become even more 
dramatic.
The HVS survey also analyzed compensation for the three primary gaming markets: 
Atlantic City; Las Vegas, and Mississippi. Geographically, Atlantic City and Las Vegas 
executives earned more than their Mississippi counterparts by a wide margin (Kefgen &  
Keung. 1999). GMs in Atlantic City earned 17 percent more than their Las Vegas peers.
The relationship between the size of a casino and executive salaries has also been 
found to be significant; an increase in size tends to result in increased compensation 
(Kefgen & Mahoney, 1996). In summary, location and size correlate to compensation 
levels within the casino sector.
While bonuses remained fairly consistent as a percentage of base salary, gaming 
executives were awarded long-term incentives in record numbers, plus short-term 
incentives. Average numbers of stock options awarded gaming executives have 
increased in most cases. In 1996, CEOs averaged 197,535 stock option grants, while in 
1998 CEOs received an average of 232,637 (Kefgen & Keung, 1999).
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Hotel
Within the hotel sector, stockholders also often wonder whether CEOs are in fact paid 
more than they deserve, and how they justify making these millions. According to the 
HVS survey, executives of larger, more complex hotels continue earning the most. Large 
convention and resort hotels pay more than their smaller all-suite and extended-stay 
counterparts. There remains a wide disparity of compensation levels for executives 
within this industry, depending on the type, class, size and geographical location of their 
hotel properties (Kefgen & Mahoney, 1998). Type of hotel refers to a property's physical 
characteristics as well as operation complexity. Complexity ranges from the simplest 
extended stay property to the most complex convention property.
The survey confirmed that size was the best predictor of compensation level. The 
only exception to that rule was compensation at small luxury resorts and boutique 
properties located in city centers (Kefgen & Mahoney. 1998).
Another factor that can substantially affect CEO compensation is geographical 
location. Managers in the Mountain/Pacific region and New England/Mid-Atlantic 
regions are generally paid more than peers in other areas, due to higher regional hotel 
value. The H V I (Hospitality Valuation Index), developed by HVS. is a hotel valuation 
benchmark based on occupancy; room rates; local operating performance; projections of 
supply and demand, and capitalization rates (Kefgen & Mahoney. 1997).
Compensation may also be correlated to the characteristics of a location itself. For 
example, hotel managers in center city and resort areas earn substantially more than do 
peers at hotels along highways or within suburbs.
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A 1996 analysis of 1996 CEO lodging industiy pay found that stock options were 
liberally dispensed. Twenty -one of the 32 CEOs profiled received long-term incentives 
in the form of stock options. Many best-paid CEOs ran companies that have been public 
for fewer than Eve years. It is more typical of a young company to be aggressive in 
granting stock options (Kefjgen & Mahoney, 1997).
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CHAPTERS 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
This study's objective is to investigate whether CEO cash compensation is linked to a 
firm's performance, and also to further identify determinants of CEO cash compensation 
within hotel, casino and restaurant sectors. Chapter 3 covers the following areas: data 
sources; sampling procedures; variables; models; statistical methodology, and hypothesis 
testing. In particular, this chapter will focus on discussion of selected variables used in 
order to justify adoption of such variables (which have not been used in previous studies).
Data Sources/Sampling Procedures 
Data Sources
1. COMPUSTAT (Research Insight)
This study tests Arms within each sector in the hospitality industry listed under 
Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC) for hotel (7011), casino (7990), and 
restaurant (5812). Sample firms of each sector were obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
This study obtained data for all Enancial measures within the sample from 
COMPUSTAT. A ll data were collected for calendar years 1995 to 2000, inclusive.
24
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2. www.edgar-online.com
The Edgar website is provided by the Securities Exchange Commission. Infbmiation 
on CEO compensation was obtained from corporate proxy statements (DEF 14A)
Eled with the Securities Exchange Commission. Proxy statements include extensive 
information pertaining to compensation of the CEO and the next four highest paid 
ofEcers. CEO cash compensation included base salary for Escal years 1995 to 2000. 
inclusive, as well as any annual bonuses earned Eom 1995 to 2000. Data of stock 
options Eom 1995 to 2000 for dummy variables was also collected Eom corporate 
proxy statements (DEF 14A).
3. www.bls.gov/cpi/
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor)
To insure comparability across years, and to eliminate the factor of effects of inEation 
on CEO cash compensation, cash compensation for each year was adjusted with CPI 
(Consumer Pnce Index). CPI infbrmaEon for 1995-2000 was obtained Eom the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4. http//Enance.yahoo.com
Annual stock pnces for computaEon of annual percentage change of stock return (SR) 
were obtained Eom http// Enance.yahoo.com. Stock pnces were adjusted for 
dividends and stock splits.
Sampling Procedures
Among sample Erms for each sector obtained Eom COMPUSTAT, Erms not directly 
related to operating hotel, casino, or restaurants, such as slot machine manufacturers.
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supplier companies, or consulEng companies, have been dropped Eom the sample. More 
detailed discussion of sampling Erm data E>r each sector is included below.
1. Hotel
The iniEal sample consisted of all hotels within Standard Industnal ClassiEcation 
(SIC) code 7011 on the 1995-2000 COMPUSTAT database. AAer excluding 
non-lodging operating companies, such as consulEng Erms, the Enal sample was 
narrowed to 22 companies.
2. Casino
The iniEal sample consisted of all casino related Erms within Standard Industnal 
ClassiEcaEon (SIC) code 7990 on the 1995-2000 COMPUSTAT database. AAer 
excluding non-casino operating companies, such as slot machine manufacturers 
and consulEng Erms, the Enal sample was narrowed to 25 companies.
3. Restaurant
The initial sample consisted of all restaurant related Erms within Standard 
Industnal ClassiEcation (SIC) code 5812 on the 1995-2000 COMPUSTAT 
database. AAer excluding non-restaurant operating companies, such as equipment 
manufacturers; management service companies; and entertainment complexes, the 
Enal sample was narrowed to 61 companies.
Like previous studies (for example, Attaway, 2000; Lobingier, 2000, and Joyce.
2001 ), this study collected mulEple-year observations of sample Erms' relevant Enancial 
data Eom 1995-2000. Other previous studies (Newman &  Bannister. 1998: Mishra &  
Nielsen. 1999:Ueng, 2000) used only single-year observations. MulE-year, rather than 
single-year performance measures are used in the present study, however, since these are
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less sensitive to transitory occurrences, and thus may provide more accurate indicators of 
CEO performance. Pooling performance data into a four or Eve-year average [as does 
the present study] also reduces variability, and provides a more reliable and valid 
measure of Erm performance than annual measures (Gomez-Mejia. Tosi. & Hinkin.
1987).
CEO compensaEon data for Erms examined within this study have been obtained from 
primary sources in the form of proxy statements. Any Erm with data unavailable on the 
Edgar website (www.edgar-online.com. provided by the Securities Exchange 
Commission) was excluded Eom the sample. Additionally, data for any given Erm have 
been included in the test sample only if  data for each dependent and independent vanable 
examined are available for at least one year covered by the study.
In general, CEO compensation for the current year (2001) had been determined based 
on prior year's perfbrmEince. Therefore, this study uses lagged Enancial firm  
performances. For example, CEO compensation for 1996 is matched with a Erm's 
Enancial firm performance for 1995. Other variables, such as Enancial condition, 
dummy (stock opEons). and Erm size are not lagged, however, since these particular 
variables do not affect CEO compensation for the next year. AAer completing all of the 
sampling processes, Enal sample sizes for each sector examined were: 53 for the hotel 
sector; 77 for the casino sector; and 188 for the restaurant sector.
Vanables
This study's main purpose is to examine determinants of CEO compensation.
Previous studies (Abowd, 1990; Crystal, 1993; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Hallock,
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1998: Schaefer, 1998) have mainly either examined one feature of one accounting 
measure, or have used very general performance measures. Another limitation of 
previous studies has been that the particular accounting measure chosen for analysis has 
been predicted to be equally important for all Erms in the sample regardless of industry 
(Duru & Iyengar, 1999; Lobingier. 2000).
Ely (1991), however, considers it crucial to also view diverse features of a given 
industry in the process of measuring firm performance; all Erms operate differently, and 
therefore experience distinct producEon environments.
Lobingier (2000) adopted nine industry groups in his executive compensation study by 
using industry-speciEc variables [the hospitality industry, however, is not included in this 
particular study]. RepresentaEve raEos used by Lobinger were those most oAen 
identiEed by S&P industry analysts, for each industry category, as important to a Erm's 
performance. Within consumer product industries, for instance, inventory turnover is 
used to measure management efEciency; with consumer tastes continually changing, it is 
relatively easy to End one's consumer-based inventory obsolete. AddiEonally, within 
these industnes, changes in sales growth are used as measures of success. According to 
industry analysts, in order to remain compeEtive, a consumer products industry company 
must have increasing sales growth.
Based, then, on raEos used within previous, similar smdies, and on the perceived 
importance of using industry-speciEc variables, nine ratios thought to have substantial 
impact on cash compensation in the hospitality industry have been selected as candidate 
variables: proEtability; liquidity; leverage; efEciency; growth rate, and market 
performance. Accounting and stock returns are used as Erm and market performance
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measures in executive compensation studies (Lambert & Larcker. 1987: Sloan. 1993). 
Market performance, however, is considered part of the proxies of Erm performance 
within this study, since Erm performance inherently reEects on market perfonnance. and 
also since market performance provides a distinct perspective on Erm performance (i.e.. 
directly Eom the market).
Variables used in this study are classiEed as: dependent variables; Erm performance; 
Enancial condiEons; dummy vanables, and control variables by function. Each variable 
speciEcation is defined and detailed below.
Dependent variable
Total cash compensation is used as a dependent vanable. For this study. CEO 
compensaEon is operaEonalized as total cash compensation. Total cash compensation is 
deEned as the sum of annual salary plus bonus. This study thus excludes deferred 
compensation beneEts like pensions; proEt sharing plans; stock options, and IRAs. Cash 
compensation is adjusted with CPI, both to insure comparability across years and to 
eliminate effects of inEation.
To normalize cash compensation and avoid biases provided by outliers, two previous 
studies (Attaway, 2000; Ueng, 2000) have used the natural loganthm of CEO salary plus 
bonus. Logarithm transformation has the effect of stretching exEemely small values and 
condensing exEemely large values of variables, thus making its relationship to the 
dependent variable more linear in a regression analysis (Norusis. 1995). As with these 
two previous studies, then, cash compensaEon is similarly log-Eansformed here.
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Independent variables
This study employed proEtability raEo; efEciency ratio: and stock return as Erm 
performance measures. Firm performance measures in this study include Eve speciEc 
raEos. These are: return on assets (ROA): net proEt margin (NPM): one-year sales 
growth rate (SG); total assets turnover (ATT), and inventory turnover ratio (IT). Within 
the restaurant sector, however, inventory is considered more important than total assets in 
measuring management efEciency. Therefore, IT  rather than ATT is used for this sector.
For Enancial condition measures, this study used three ratios, including long-term debt 
to capitalizaEon (LDR) and qiEck ratio (QR). Precisely, EBITDA interest coverage (IC) 
is considered a measure of both Erm performance and financial condition, since EBITDA 
is another measure of Erm performance, and since interest coverage indicates another 
aspect of Enancial condition. Detailed discussions of each variable are offered below.
Firm performance
1. ProEtability
Prior studies on determinants of CEO pay focus mostly on the relationship between 
CEO pay and Erm performance, proxied by proEtability raEos (Jensen & Murphy 1990). 
Other previous studies (Jensen & Murphy, 1990. Ueng, 2000) End CEO pay closely 
associated with a Erm's ROA. The present study employs a Erm's return on assets 
(ROA) and net proEt margin (NPM) as variables measuring the Erm's proEtability.
NPM represents a different aspect of proEtability, and has thus been added to ascertain 
which aspects of proEtability demonstrate the strongest impact on CEO compensation.
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2. Growth rate
This study uses one-year change of sales growth. Previous studies End CEO pay 
closely associated with a Erm's growth rate. Sndharah (1996) found a positive 
relationship between CEO pay and growth in sales. Winn & Shoenhair (1988). however, 
conclude, paradoxically, that compensaEon is negaEvely related to revenue growth rates. 
This particular Ending may in fact be taken as support for BaumoTs hypothesis that 
managers have nonpecuniary motives to maximize revenues. This particular Ending may 
in fact be taken as support for BaumoTs hypothesis that managers have nonpecuniary 
motives to maximize revenues.
3. EfEciency
The present study uses asset turnover (ATT) for the hotel and casino sector and 
inventory turnover (IT ) for the restaurant sector, respectively, as measures of 
management efEciency. Since cost of goods sold (COGS) is a major expense factor 
within the restaurant sector, high inventory turnover indicates a manager's efEciency 
level in generating sales revenue. Therefore, especially for the restaurant sector. IT is 
considered a supenor measure of management efEciency. Lobingier (2000) used IT  to 
examine the consumer product industry. In that study, IT  was deemed positively related 
to compensation. ATT, however, is a newer proxy not considered in previous studies. 
Based on the importance of industry-speciEc variables, ATT is employed for the hotel 
and casino sectors, respecEvely, although not the restaurant sector, since it measures 
overall efEciency of management using all assets, including Exed assets such as rooms 
and facilities. Since the hotel and casino sectors are Exed asset-intensive industries, bnsk 
utility of Exed assets is important to generaEng revenues. ATT, which instead measures
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total assets, is however considered more important than ATT within the hotel and casino 
sectors.
Financial conditions
1. Liquidity
This study uses quick ratio (QR), a new proxy not found in previous studies of this 
sort, to represent Erm liquidity. The casino sector in parEcular possesses the tendency of 
high QR. QR is used within this study to ascertain whether high levels of cash liquidity 
used to absorb current liabilities have impact on cash compensation in the hospitality 
industry as well
2. Leverage Ratio
The current study uses long-term debt to total capitalizaEon (LTD) and EBITDA 
interest coverage ratio (IC ) to represent a Erm's leverage condiEon. These are two 
additional proxies unused in other studies. Like QR, a Erm's leverage condition is 
thought to have effect on CEO compensation wdthin the hospitality industry. According 
to Jensen (1986), debt leverage is considered a mechanism to conEol agency cost related 
to Eee cash Eow. Therefore, using debts may help in reducing agency problems by 
providing ample compensaEon. High EBITDA to pay interest is believed to have a 
posiEve correlation to compensation. According to Kefgen, president of HVS Executive 
Search (1997), growth in EBITDA, rather than net income and ROE. is used as a 
performance cntenon to reEect investors' increased interest in EBITDA.
Market performance
One-year stock return is used here as a measure of market performance. Lewellen &  
Huntsman (1970) theonzed that stock performance relates to company performance, and
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also found equity market values to be a major factor in the determination of corporate 
executive compensaEon levels. Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) also used stock reEim as a 
variable in their study. Kerr &  BeEis (1987) explored this same relationship by analyzing 
annual stock returns.
Control variable
CEOs of larger companies tend to be beEer compensated than CEOs of smaller ones. 
Three previous studies (Ciscel & Carroll. 1980; Gomez-Mejia &  Wiseman 1997; 
Finkelstein &  Hambnck, 1989) show CEO compensaEon closely correlated to Erm size. 
Firm size has therefore been conEolled within the present study. To measure firm size, 
Mishra & Nielsen (1999) use the logarithm of total assets. This smdy also employs a 
Erm's total assets (LOGAST, the natural logarithm of a Erm's total assets).
Empincal Endings suggest a size/pay relationship causal, and therefore reEective of 
more than a matching of CEOs to Erms based on ability. These Endings also show CEOs 
tend to increase their pay with increased Erm size, even when a size increase reduces a 
Erm's overall market value.
Dummv vanable
This also study uses a dummy variable to determine whether companies offering stock 
opEons tend also to pay less cash compensation. The dummy variable is coded "1 " for 
Erms providing stock options in addition to cash compensation, and "0" for Erms not 
providing stock opEons plus cash compensation. I f  the dummy vanable is posiEve and 
signiEcant, this indicates that companies offering stock options tend to give higher levels 
of cash compensation, while companies that do not offer stock options give lower ones.
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Model
Multiple regression models were established for the present study to identify 
determinants of CEO cash compensation. CEO compensation was selected as the 
dependent variable (Y ) to be predicted by variables representing Erm performance; 
Enancial conditions, and firm size, as well as the dummy variable. The same regression 
is run separately for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors. The regression model 
consists of the following:
Annual cash CEO compensaEon
= bo + b|* ROA + bz *NPM + bs * QR + b4 * SG + b̂  * LTD + b6*EIC + 
b? *ATT / IT  + bg * SR + b9 * TA + b,o * DUM M Y  
where bo = constant of the regression equation
b|, bz, b], b4 . b;, b&, b?, bg, bp, and b,o = coefEcient of ROA, NPM. QR.
SG, LTD, IC, ATT/IT, SR. TA. and DUM M Y
Ten variables within the model consist of 1 ) Erm performance (ROA, NPM, SG, SR. 
and ATT/ IT); 2) Enancial condiEons (QR, 1C, and LTD); 3) control variable (TA); and 
4) the dummy variable (stock option). For the restaurant sector, inventory turnover (IT ) 
is used instead of asset turnover (ATT) as a proxy of a Erm's management efEciency 
because inventory is a beEer measurement of management efEciency than is total assets 
within that sector. A disEnct relationship between each variable and CEO compensation 
is hypothesized here in order to aEempt to prove various (perceived) determinants of 
CEO compensaEon.
This study also expects to discover a positive relationship between CEO effectiveness 
and Erm performance, thus justifying greater Enancial rewards for CEOs. It is therefore
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important to identify' all factors determining the relative importance of CEO 
compensation. To examine the determinants of CEO cash compensation on the basis of 
selected variables in the above model, it is hypothesized that:
Null Hvtwtheses
Ho: Each coefficient of variables in the model is not correlated with cash
compensation for firms in the hospitality industry.
(hi -  0)
b], bz, b3 , b4 , b;, bg, b?, bg, b9 , and bio -  coefficient of ROA, NPM, QR,
SG, LTD, IC, A TT/IT, SR, TA, and DUM M Y  
Alternative Hvnotheses 
Ha: Each coefficient of variables in the model is correlated with cash
compensation for firms in the hospitality industry.
(hi :̂ 0)
1. The coefficient of ROA is positively correlated with cash compensation for 
Erms in the hospitality industry.
(bi>0)
2. The coefEcient of NPM is posiEvely correlated with cash compensation for 
Erms in the hospitality industry.
(bz >0)
3. The coefEcient of QR is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms 
in the hospitality industry.
(b] >0)
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4. The coefEcient of SG is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms 
in the hospitality industry.
(b4 >0)
5. The coefEcient of LTD is negatively correlated with cash compensation for 
firms in the hospitality industry .
(bs <0)
6. The coefEcient of IC is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms 
in the hospitality industry.
(bg >0)
7. The coefEcient of ATT is positively correlated with cash compensation for 
Erms in the hospitality industry.
(b? >0)
8. The coefEcient of IT  is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms 
in the hospitality industry.
(b? >0)
9. The coefEcient of SR is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms 
in the hospitality industry.
(bg >0)
10. The coefEcient of Erm size is positively correlated with cash compensation 
for Erms in the hospitality industry.
(bg >0)
11. The coefEcient of the dummy variable is negatively correlated with cash 
compensation for Erms in the hospitality industry.
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(b,o<0)
The same hypothesis is tested for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors, 
respectively. For testing the hypothesis, if  the coefEcient of a variable is signiEcant as 
stated direction in the alternative hypothesis, its null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that 
the variable is a determinant of CEO cash compensation.
StatisEcal Methodology and Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis in this study was tested using both multiple regression analysis and 
correlation analysis (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Kerr &  BeEis; 1987; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990; Miller, 1995). Multiple regression models are used to investigate the 
relationship between CEO cash compensaEon and Erm performance, and to further 
examine the determinants of CEO compensaEon. The same regression is run separately 
for each of the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors.
The term multicolinearity refers to the linear relaEonship between independent 
variables. Its presence can make a multiple regression model unreliable. To detect a 
potential problem with mulEcolineanty, tolerance and V IF values are calculated in this 
study. A high tolerance indicates liEle colinearity, and tolerance values approaching zero 
indicate that the variables are almost totally accounted for by other variables. The 
variance inEation factor (V IF) is the reciprocal of the tolerance value. Therefore, small 
VIF values would be an indication of low intercorrelation among variables (Hair et al., 
1995).
To check senally correlated or auto-correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test is 
conducted in this study. One assumption of regression analysis is that the residuals for
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consecutive observations are uncorrelated. I f  true, the expected value of the Durbin- 
Watson statistic is 2. Values of less than 2 indicate posibve autocorrelation, a common 
problem in time-series data. Values greater than 2 indicate negative autocorrelation.
For data normality concerns, cash compensation and total assets were transformed b\' 
taking their base 10 logarithms, since these two variables reveal departure from the 
diagonal line, indicative of a departure from normality (skewness). These logarithms 
were subsEtuted for the onginal values in this analysis. The Eansfbrmed variables can be 
used with the assurance that they met the assumpEons for normality (Hair et al., 1995).
Since the ultimate objective is to identify determinants of compensation in a model 
that has the greatest explanatory power, this study uses backward elimination in running 
the regression in SPSS to obtain an opEmal model. Backward elimination is a variable 
selection procedure for which all variables are entered into the equation, and then 
sequentially removed. I f  it meets the cnteria for elimination, it is removed. AAer the 
Erst variable is removed, the remaining v ariable within the equation that has the smallest 
partial correlation is next considered. The procedure ends when there are no variables in 
the equation that saEsfy the removal cntena. The same regression was run separately for 
both the casino and restaurant sectors
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Introduction
In Chapter 3, research methodology and data collection were discussed. This chapter 
will present the results and Endings of this study. The chapter is organized as follows:
1. DescripEon of Sample
a. DescnpEve StaEsEcs for CEO cash compensaEon
b. DescnpEve StaEsEcs for Variables
2. Hypothesis TesEng
c. Tests of regression vanables.
IiEtially, the descripEve staEsEcs of the smdy are offered to provide an overview of 
the data set. Then, the results generated by the mulEple regressions using backward 
eliminaEon for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sector respectively will illustrate the 
relaEonship between cash compensaEon and variables selected in the model, and further 
idenEfy factors in the determinaEon of CEO cash compensaEon.
The results of the mulEple regression demonstrate adjusted R Square, Durbin-Watson 
(DW), Tolerance, VIF, t values, the staEsEcal signiEcance of independent variables, 
selected variables out of onginaUy employed ten variables in the model.
39
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Description of Sample 
DescripEon of Cash Compensation 
In order to see the changes of cash compensation for three sectors by year, the cash 
compensation is demonsEated separately for each sector. Compensation data for year 
2000 is not presented, due to very limited data availability.
Table 2
Descnntive StaEsEcs for CEO Cash CompensaEon of Hotel
Year Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
1995 $474,487 $398.000 $429,312 $36.000 $1 .496 ,000
1996 $489,722 $373,054 $438.999 $100.000 $1 ,650 ,620
1997 $620,633 $699,537 $359,892 $52,500 $2,957̂ ,500
1998 $475,097 $407.269 $359.370 $146.020 $1 .951 .300
1999 $580,009 $453,918 $427,296 $172.098 $1 .973,,884
The mean of CEO compensation of the hotel sector has gradually increased year by 
year except during 1998, with an average annual increase of 7.125%, while the average 
annual increase of median is only 0.75%. This indicates that there is not much increase 
of compensation in the overall hotel sector. Among the 22 sample Erms, Starwood 
Hotels & Resorts (HOT) had the greatest CEO compensation of $2,957,500 in 1997.
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Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics for CEO Cash Compensation of Casino
Year Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
1995 $596,017 $393.628 $583,333 $91.985 $1 .574.,137
1996 $518.158 $403,798 $382.055 $65.423 $1 .500.,000
1997 $634,475 $516,874 $479,835 $70.000 $1 .996.,500
1998 $768,674 $538.795 $654.591 $87.308 $1 .996.,500
1999 $1,086,720 $986,308 $729,549 $27,000 $4.007.,693
The mean of CEO compensation for the casino sector has gradually increased year by 
year except during 1996, with an average annual increase of 17.98%. The average annual 
increase of median is 9.74%. This indicates there is some increase of compensation in 
the overall casino sector. Mr. Arthur Goldberg of Park Place Entertainment (PPE) 
received the greatest cash compensation of $4,007,693 in 1999. 1999 is the only 
available year in the proxy statements of PPE. Thus, the relatively huge jump of mean of 
1999 may be explained by a single huge data of 1999 cash compensaEon of PPE.
Table 4.
Descnntive Statistics for CEO Cash Compensation of Restaurant
Year Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
1995 $409.788 $388,170 $293,105 $1,995 $2.,100.,925
1996 $452.206 $458.658 $298,843 $1.996 $2.,048.,475
1997 $481,027 $564,116 $270,000 $1,997 $3.,073.,294
1998 $598,934 $712,703 $340,000 $1.998 $3..600..000
1999 $607,248 $692,978 $336,023 $1.999 $3..330..000
The mean of CEO compensation for the restaurant sector has gradually increased year 
by year with an average annual increase of 10.65%, while the average annual increase of
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median is 3.98%, indicating some increase of CEO cash compensation in the restaurant 
sector. The median in 1997 dropped to 270,000. This year. CEO compensation of the 
100 best-compensated CEOs in the restaurant sector showed veiy respectable year-to 
year increases by 13.2% among the highest-paid CEOs. But real action was in the 
generous granting of stock options (RafGo, 1997).
As to the greatest CEO compensation, Tricon Global Restaurants was ranked top for 
the consecutive two years of 1998 and 1999, beating the previous winner. MacDonald's. 
However, through further examination of the data, it was found that MacDonald's had 
increased its stock options in relation to the moderate salary rate over years.
Description of variables
Table 5.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Hotel
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
Dummy 0.611 0.492 1 0 ]
ROA 3.2246 4.214 3.055 -10.718 14.957
NPM 6.206 9.9197 4.669 -26.31 34.676
SR 10.689 74.2798 -3.4395 -65.907 440
SG 63.8674 138.1372 15.775 -66.72 850.3
LTD 52.0684 24.2213 51.4725 0 99.307
IN T CO 7.9309 21.6123 2.8265 -21.846 125.5
QR 1.0388 1.3123 0.694 0.24 8.569
ATT 0.7176 0.5713 0.5245 0.124 2.481
TA($mil) $1,161.94 $1,973.22 $357.31 $10.03 $7,826.00
Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics of independent variables for the sample 
of 22 hotels with 53 observations from 1995 to 2000. As would be expected, some very 
wide variations exist for some of the variables, as indicated in Table 5. For example, 
percentage change of one-year stock return (SR) has an average of 10.7%, with a
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standard deviation of 74.3%. Similarly, the one-year sales growth rate (SG) has an 
average of 63.9%, with a standard deviation of 138.2%. These variations reveal 
significant differences between the largest and the smallest values. The total asset size of 
the firm is widely spread from $10.03 million to $7,826 million, with an average firm 
size of $1,162 million. The largest is 780.25 times the size of the smallest.
Table 6.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Casino
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
Dummy 0.4487 0.5005 0 0 1
ROA 0.2339 10.5116 1.4865 -53.707 20.161
NPM 0.6426 12.1486 2.588 -70.674 23.204
SR -0.3983 56.1001 -16.767 -80.281 232.275
SG 26.6188 36.5475 15.345 -49.5 171.86
LTD 55.7344 26.8581 59.314 0.175 113.301
IN T CO 21.3516 121.2091 2.7065 -17 1050.398
QR 1.1778 1.1798 0.8215 0.084 7.628
ATT 0.9306 0.6299 0.7695 0.391 4.016
TA ($mil) $717.01 $876.53 $323.03 $4.41 $3,869.71
Table 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics of independent variables for the sample 
of 25 casinos with 77 observations from 1995 to 2000. While the mean of EBITDA to 
interest coverage ratio (IC) is 21.35, the median is only 2.7. The largest ratio of IC 
(1050.398) may result in a comparatively higher mean than median. Compared to the 
hotel sector, the casino and restaurant sectors show lower NPM by 9.64 times, indicating 
these two sectors perform poorly in terms of profitability compared to the hotel sector. 
The mean of stock return is -0.39% with the median o f-16.7%, suggesting that overall 
stock performance is poor in the casino sector. Total asset size of the firms is widely
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ranged from $ 4.41 million to $3,870 million, with an average firm size of $ 717.02 
million. The largest is 877.35 times the size of the smallest.
Table 7.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Restaurant
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
Dummy 0.5925 0.4926 1 0 1
ROA -0.3076 15.9424 3.829 -95.985 27.848
NPM 0.6494 9.3985 2.353 -65.008 31.547
SR 1.5992 44.7585 -4.96 -98.895 150.321
SG 12.2414 22.9037 8.5 -44.69 152
LTD 40.8743 44.1848 29.133 -78.281 317.864
IN T CO 22.741 119.3351 7.026 -30.559 1576.923
QR 0.4773 0.4625 0.338 0.008 3.225
IT 66.7847 39.3934 55.939 8.551 201.172
TA($ mil) $652.79 $2,577.94 $105.33 $4.02 $19,784.40
Table 7 summarizes descriptive statistics of independent variables for the sample of 
61 restaurants with 188 observations from 1995 to 2000. Among the three sectors, the 
restaurant sector indicates the lowest average of 40.87 % of LTD. Stock return has an 
average of 1.59% and a median of -4.96% with a standard deviation of 44.76%, 
indicating comparatively poor stock performance.
Total asset size of the firm ranges widely from $ 4.02 million to $19,784.4 million, 
with an average firm size of $652.79 million. The largest is 4,921.5 times the size of the 
smallest, suggesting that the m^ority of the sample consists of small firms.
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Hypotheses Testing
The hypothesis is tested to examine the determinants of CEO compensation in the 
model by using multiple regression analysis.
Regression Analysis
A multiple regression analysis was attempted to examine the determinants of CEO 
compensation for each sector. To apply this procedure, CEO compensation was selected 
as the dependent variable (Y ) to be predicted by variables representing Erm performance: 
Enancial condiEons; dummy variable (stock option), and control variable (Erm size).
Table 8 presents the result of regression equations estimated to investigate the 
determinants of CEO compensation in the hotel sector. Presented in the table are model- 
adjusted R Square, Durbin-Watson (DW ). the coefEcients of the independent variables, t 
values, tolerance and VIE, two statistics for checking multicollinearity. Since the main 
purpose of this study is to idenEfy the determinants of CEO cash compensation, the 
modePs explanatory power is important. In an attempt to establish a model that has the 
most explanatory power with selected variables, this study used backward elimination in 
running the regression in SPSS.
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Table 8
Regression Summan  ̂for Hotel
Variable Regression T Value SigniEcance Tolerance VIF  
CoefEcient
Intercept 424016.97
Firm
performance
Positively A T T ***
signiEcant (+)
Negatively SR***
signiEcant (-)
Financial
condition
Positively IC ***
signiEcant (+)
Negatively LTD **
signiEcant (-)
Control T A ***
variable
(Erm size)
Dummy Dummy*
variable
(stock option)
N 53
Adjusted R 0.756
DW 1.381
* =P<. 10
** =P<. 05
182571.3 
-1876.083
10497.12
-3244.929
0.000127
121003.3
3.004 .004 .716 1.396
-5.14 .000 .339 2.954
3.711 .001 .369 2.712
-2.32 .025 .685 1.459
7.682 .000 .802 1.247
1.963 .056 .954 1.049
* * *  =p<_ 001
Table 8 shows the summary of the Enal model through backward elimination for the 
hotel sector. Overall regression results are good. The adjusted R Square of 0.756 
indicates a high proportion of explained variance to the total variance of the dependent 
variable. To test for the impact of collinearity of variables in the Enal model, tolerance 
and V IF values were calculated. A high tolerance and small V IF values would be an 
indication of low intercorrelaEon among variables (Hair et al., 1995). For this analysis.
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all the tolerance values in the model are greater than 0.1. and VIF values are less than 10. 
as shown in Table 8. These results indicate that interpretation of the regression 
coefEcients should not be affected adversely by multicollinearity (Norusis. 1995).
To check serially correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test was conducted in this 
study. One of the assumptions of regression analysis is that the residuals for consecutive 
observations are not correlated. For this analysis, a DW value of 1.381 is less than 2, 
indicating that there may be posiEve autocorrelaEon. a common problem in time-senes 
data. Dummy variables were added to control for the possible impact of time series on 
the serial residual correlation. The DW  value, however, did not increase.
Among the onginally employed ten selected vanables, four are found to be positively 
signiEcant, and two negaEvely signiEcant in the backward selection model. The other 
four variables (ROA; NPM; SG, and QR) fail to be the determinants of CEO 
compensation in the model of the hotel sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis of each 
variable eliminated in the model is not rejected, illusEating that the coefEcient of each 
variable is not correlated with cash compensation.
The relaEonship between CEO compensation and dummy, interest coverage (IC): total 
asset turnover (ATT), and total asset (TA) are highly signiEcant at the .10, .001, and .001 
levels, respectively. The null hypothesis for each of IC, ATT, and TA is rejected, 
indicating that each of these variables is positively correlated with CEO cash 
compensaEon.
The null hypothesis of dummy is rejected at the .10 level: however, its positive 
coefEcient is contrary to the expected negative correlation. This positive coefEcient
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shows that companies offering stock options tend to give higher cash pay while 
companies without such ophons tend to give lower cash pay.
The relationship between CEO compensaEon and SR and LTD is found to be 
negatively signiEcant at the .001 and .05 levels, respectively. The null hypothesis for 
LTD is rejected, indicating that LTD is negatively correlated with cash compensation as 
expected. Although SR had been expected to correlate positively with cash 
compensation in the alternative hypothesis, the coefEcient of SR was found to be 
negative and signiEcant. The negative correlation indicates that CEOs of hotels with 
lower stock returns were not penalized by lower cash compensations. On the contrary, 
they actually received more.
More detailed analysis by funcEon of variables is discussed below:
Firm performance
A set of variables of ROA; NPM; SR; SG; IC and ATT is employed in this study as 
measures of Erm performance. In the hotel sector, ATT is found to be positively 
signiEcant at the .001 level. suggesEng that cash compensation is accounted for by 
management efEciency rather than by the Erm's proEtability or growth rate in the hotel 
sector. However, stock return (SR) as an estimate of market performance shows 
negatively signiEcant coefEcient with CEO compensation at the .001 level, indicating 
that lower SR does not lead to lower CEO compensation. Although prior studies suggest 
that the Erm's market return is posiEvely related to CEO compensation, this study did not 
End evidence to support the previous Ending. The example of Trump Hotel may support 
the surpnsing Endings of SR in the hotel sector. In 1996, Trump Hotel increased its 
CEO pay package by 71 %, despite a more than 70% drop in the share of its stock
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(Binkley &  Christina. 1997). Host Marriott Corp is another example. In 1996. Terence 
C. Golden. President of Host Marriott Corp. received 11 percent higher compensation 
than the industry midpoint in the Forbes tally, although Host Marriott's total return was 
more than 200 percent above the industry median (Behr. 1997). Therefore, these two 
examples support the claim that executive compensation is not always tied to stock 
performance (Behr, 1997).
Financial conditions 
A set of variables of LTD; IC and QR is employed in this study as measures of a 
Arm's Enancial condiEons in an aEempt to examine whether such Enancial condiEons 
have any impact on CEO cash compensation. Financial condiEons have not been 
examined in previous studies of CEO compensaEon.
Both IC and LTD are found to be signiEcant, indicaEng that CEO cash compensation 
is affected by a Erm's leverage conditions in the hotel sector. As expected in the 
alternative hypothesis, EBITDA interest coverage (IC) shows a positive impact on cash 
compensaEon. suggesting high EBITDA to pay interest tend to lead to high cash 
compensaEon. The negative coefEcient of LTD suggests that the more LTD a Erm has, 
the less compensaEon it tends to offer, and vice versa. This result supports Endings by 
Jensen (1986) that debt leverage is regarded as a mechanism for controlling agency cost 
related to Eee cash Eow. Therefore, using debts may help in reducing agency problem 
by providing ample compensaEon.
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Control variable
The result of a high signiEcant coefEcient of TA is consistent with Endings Eom prior 
studies that CEO compensation is positively related to Erm size, indicating that CEOs of 
larger companies are beEer compensated than are CEOs of smaller ones.
Dummv variable
A positively signiEcant coefEcient of dummy variable of the hotel sector indicates 
that companies offering stock options tend to give higher cash pay, while companies 
without such stock options tend to give lower cash pay. This Ending is supported by 
Terry Conley, Senior VP of Cendant Corp. who states that stock options have always 
been a major part of the compensation package of the lodging industry , even during 1988. 
when the company's stock value was at its lowest (Walsh, 2001).
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Table 9
Regression Summary for Casino
Variable Regression T Value SigniEcance Tolerance VIF
CoefEcient
Intercept 2.935
Firm
performance
Positively ROA* 0.00488 1.899 .062 .703 1.422
signiEcant (+)
NegaEvely A TT** -0.132 -3.001 .004 .609 1.641
signiEcant (-)
Financial
condition
Positively QR** 0.05581 2.188 .032 .512 1.952
signiEcant (+)
Negatively IC * -0.00206 -1.907 .062 .703 1.422
signiEcant (-)
Control T A *** 0.327 7.693 .000 .530 1.886
variable
(Erm size)
Dummy Dummy*** 0.153 3.299 .002 .918 1.09
variable
(stock option)
N 77
Adjusted R 0.727
DW 1.459
* = P<. 10
** =P<. 05
*** =P<. 001
Table 9 shows the summary of the Enal model through backward elimination in the 
casino sector. Overall regression results are good. The adjusted R Square of 0.727 
indicates a high proportion of explained variance to the total variance of the model. 
Impact of variable collinearity in the Enal model was tested by calculaEng tolerance and 
VIF values. For this analysis, all tolerance values in the model are greater than 0.1 and
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VIF values less than 10. which indicates that interpretation of the regression coefficients 
in this model should not be affected adversely by multicollinearit)
To check serially correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test was performed in this 
model. For this analysis, a DW value of 1.459 is lesser than 2, indicating that there might 
be positive autocorrelation, a common problem in Eme-series data. Dummy variables 
were added to conEol for possible impact of time senes on the serial residual correlation. 
The DW value, however, did not increase.
Among the onginally employed ten selected variables, four are found to be positively 
signiEcant, and two to be negatively signiEcant in the backward selection model. The 
other four variables (NPM; SR; SG. and LTD) fail to explain the CEO compensation in 
the model of the casino sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis of each of the variables 
eliminated in the model is not rejected, indicaEng that the coefEcient of each variable is 
not correlated with cash compensation.
The relationships between CEO compensation (log base 10) and QR; ROA; dummy, 
and TA (log base 10) are sigiEEcantly positive at the .05, .10. .001. and .001 levels, 
respectively. The null hypothesis for each of QR; ROA, and TA is rejected, indicating 
each of these vanables positively correlated with CEO cash compensation. As in the hotel 
sector, the null hypothesis of dummy is not rejected. demonsEating that companies 
offering stock option tend to give higher cash pay while companies without option tend to 
give low cash pay.
The relationship between CEO compensation and ATT and 1C is found to be 
negatively signiEcant at the .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Although both ATT and IC 
are expected as correlated positively with cash compensation in the alternative
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hypothesis, each coefEcient of ATT and IC is found to be negative. Therefore, each null 
hypothesis is rejected, but an opposite alternative hypothesis holds. More detailed 
analysis by funcEon of variables is given below.
Firm performance
A set o f variables of ROA; NPM; SR; SG; IC and ATT is employed in this study as 
measures of Erm performance. In the casino sector, ROA is found to be positively 
signiEcant at the .10 level, suggesting that ROA explains cash compensation beEer than 
NPM Eom a proEtability aspect. This result is consistent with Endings of previous 
studies that ROA is posiEvely coEelated with compensaEon. However, ATT as an 
estimate of management efEciency shows negatively signiEcant coefEcient with CEO 
compensation at the .05 level, indicaEng that low ATT is associated with high CEO 
compensation. This surprising result may be explained by recent increases of total assets 
of large casinos Erms in their developments of new mega-resoEs. ATT is affected not 
only by total sales, but also by total assets. In recent years, many new mega casino 
resoEs have opened. As a result, the increase in total assets in the casino sector outpaced 
total sales. Therefore, the negaEvely signiEcant coefEcient of ATT indicates that total 
asset explains ATT even beEer than total sales does.
Financial condiEons 
A set of variables of LTD; IC and QR is employed in this study as measures of a 
Erm's Enancial conditions in an aEempt to examine whether these Enancial conditions 
have any impact on CEO cash compensation. In the casino sector, QR is found to be 
signiEcant and positive as expected in the altemaEve hypothesis, indicating that the more 
ability to pay shoE-term liabilities a Erm has, the more cash compensation tends to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
paid. This interesting result may reEect the casino sector's general tendency of high QR. 
However. IC is found to be negatively correlated with cash compensaEon in contrast to 
its alternative hypothesis. This contrary result may indicate that casino Erms that want to 
maintain high coverage ability are less likely to lavish cash on executive compensation.
ConEol variable
As in the hotel sector, the result of a positively signiEcant coefEcient of TA is 
consistent with Endings of pnor studies that CEO compensation is positively related to 
Erm size.
Dummv variable
Like the hotel sector, the casino sector also shows a positively signiEcant coefEcient 
of dummy variable, indicaEng that companies offenng stock options tend to give higher 
cash pay while companies without such opEons tend to give lower cash pay.
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Table 10
Regression Summary for Restaurant
Variable Regression T Value SigniEcance Tolerance VIF  
CoefEcient
Intercept 2.44
Firm
performance
PosiEvely SR*
signiEcant (+)
Financial
condition
Negatively LTD*
signiEcant (-)
Control T A ***
variable
(Erm size)
N 188
Adjusted R 0.697
DW 1.034
0.000589 1.787
-0.000656 -1.763
0.389 19.672
.076 .954
.080 .976
.000 .977
1.048
1.025
1.023
* =P<. 10
** =P<. 05
* * *  — p< QOl
Table 10 shows the summary of Enal model through backward eliminaEon in the 
restaurant sector. Overall regression results are good. Among the three sectors, the 
restaurant sector shows the lowest adjusted R Square of 0.697. but still indicates a high 
proporEon of explained variance to the total variance of the model. For the analysis of 
collinearity of variables in the model, all of the tolerance values in the model are greater 
than O.l and VIF values are less than 10, indicaEng that interpretation of the regression 
coefEcients in this model should not be affected adversely by multicollinearity.
To check senally correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test was performed in this 
model. For this analysis, a DW  value of 1.034 is less than 2, suggesting the indication of 
a positive autocorrelation, a common problem in time-series data. Dummy variables
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
were added to conEol for the possible impact of time series on the serial residual 
correlation. The DW value, however, did not increase.
In comparing three sectors of the hospitality industry , the restaurant sector found the 
least number of determinants of CEO compensation in the regression model. Among 
the originally employed ten selected variables, two variables are found to be positively 
signiEcant and one negatively signiEcant in the backward selection model. The other 
seven variables fail to explain the determinants of CEO compensation in the model of the 
restaurant sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis of each of the variables eliminated Eom 
the model is not rejected, indicating that then coefEcients are not correlated with cash 
compensaEon.
The relaEonship between CEO compensation (log base 10) and 1 Yr stock return (SR). 
and total asset (TA) are positively signiEcant at the .10 and .001 levels, respectively. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis for each of SR and TA is rejected, indicating that each of 
these variables is positively correlated with CEO cash compensation in the restaurant 
sector. This results suppoE Endings in previous studies that each of SR and TA is 
positively related with CEO compensation.
The relationship between CEO compensation and LTD, representing a Erm's leverage 
ratio, is found to be negatively signiEcant at the .10 level in the model as expected in its 
alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the null hypothesis of LTD is rejected, indicaEng that 
LTD is negatively correlated with CEO cash compensation. This result indicates that 
companies that have a low long-term debt ratio tend to offer more cash compensaEon and 
vice versa. More detailed analysis by funcEon of variables is given below.
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Firm performance
A set of variables of ROA; NPM; SR; SG; IC and ATT is employed in this study as 
measures of Erm performance. In the restaurant sector, the stock return (SR). 
representing a Erm's market performance, is found to be staEstically signiEcant at the .10 
level. This indicates SR is positively correlated with CEO cash compensation.
Therefore, the result of SR is consistent with Endings Eom prior studies that CEO 
compensation is posiEvely related to stock return.
However, ROA; NPM; SG; IC and ATT are not found in the model, indicating that 
each of these variables is not correlated with CEO cash compensation. This indicates that 
proEtability, sales growth, and management efEciency are not determinants of CEO 
compensation in the restaurant sector. Only market perf]rmance among variables of Erm 
performance is a factor in determination of CEO compensation
Financial conditions
A set of variables of LTD; IC and QR is employed in this study as measures of a 
Erm's Enancial condition. In the restaurant sector. LTD is found to be signiEcant and 
negative at the .10 level, indicaEng that LTD is negatively correlated with cash 
compensaEon. This result suggests that if  a Erm's capital structure relies more on 
borrowed funds, less compensation tends to be paid, and vice versa. This result suppoEs 
Endings by Jensen (1986) that debt leverage is regarded as a mechanism for conEolling 
agency cost related to Eee cash Eow.
ConEol variable
As in the hotel and casino sectors, Erm size is positively related with the 
compensation in the restaurant sectors, showing that CEOs of larger companies are beEer
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compensated than are CEOs of smaller ones. The result of a high signiEcant coefEcient 
of TA at the .001 level is consistent with Endings Eom prior studies that CEO 
compensation is positively related to Erm size.
Dummv variable
Unlike in the hotel and casino sectors, dummy variable is not shown in the Enal model 
in the restaurant sector, indicating that stock option is not correlated with cash 
compensation.
Table 11 summarizes the variables E)und in the model as determinants of CEO cash 
compensation by Erm performance; financial conditions; conEol variable, and dummy 
variable for the hotel; casino, and restaurant sectors, respectively.
Table 11.
Summary of Variables Found in the Model
Hotel Casino Restaurant
Proxy of firm performance
Positively signiEcant (+) A T T *** ROA* SR ***
Negatively signiEcant (-) SR*** A TT**
Proxy of financial condition
Positively signiEcant (+) %(]*** QR**
Negatively signiEcant (-) LTD ** IC* LTD*
Control variable (Arm size) T A *** T A *** T A ***
Dummy variable (stock option) Dummy* Dummy***
Adjusted R square 0.756 0.727 0.697
*
**
❖
= P<. 10
= P<. 05 
-P < . 001
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
The issue of top management compensaEon has received widespread attenEon Eom 
public concerns, stockholders, and regulating agencies for many years. Research on top 
management compensaEon has taken place for more than 70 years. However, despite the 
fact that much criEcism has been given about unreasonable pay and inordinately high 
CEO pay in the hospitality industry, liEle research on hospitality CEO compensaEon 
itself has been done.
The m^or theoreEcal Eamework for researching CEO pay comes Eom agency theory. 
Much literature on execuEve compensaEon relies on the intuiEon of the pnncipal-agent 
model. In parEcular, there is a presumpEon managers will have large pay-performance 
sensiEviEes to align their interests with those of their shareholders. A positive 
relaEonship between CEO compensaEon and Erm performance would be consistent with 
agency theory (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998).
The main focus of this study is to examine determinants of CEO compensaEon among 
selected variables for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors of the hospitality industry 
using mulEple regression analysis.
59
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A sample of 22 hotels (SIC 7011); 25 casinos (SIC 7990): and 61 restaurants (SIC 
5812): were collected for analysis for each sector. Taking its cue Eom previous studies 
(AEaway, 2000: Lobingier. 2000; Joyce. 2001), this study used multiple-year 
observations. The Enal samples of the restaurant, hotel and casino sectors consisted of 
53, 77, and 188 observations respecEvely. In order to achieve the objective of identifying 
determinants of compensation, this study was much concerned with selection of 
candidate factors that might affect hospitality CEO compensaEon.
Ely (1991) emphasized the importance of industry-speciEc variables in measuring 
Erm performance. As such, it is important to consider different features for each sector of 
the hospitality industry. One problem with previous studies has been that the particular 
accounEng measure has been predicted to be equally important for all Erms in the 
sample, regardless of industry (Duru &  Iyengar. 1999; Lobingier, 2000). Therefore, this 
study expanded the spectrum of financial raEos to invesEgate determinants of CEO 
compensation Eom a Erm's various perspectives, ranging proEtability, growth, leverage, 
liquidity, and efEciency. In addition to eight Enancial variables, total assets and stock 
options were included as a conEol variable and a dummy variable, respecEvely.
MulEple regression analysis was applied to each sector to develop the compensaEon 
predicEon model in order to idenEfy determinants of CEO compensation. The summary 
of results for each sector is demonstrated below.
Hotel
Using backward eliminaEon procedure, six variables Eom the original list of ten were 
incorporated into the model for the hotel sector. These identiEed determinants of 
compensation were: ATT; SR; IC; LTD; TA, and dummy. ATT; IC; TA, and dummy
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were positively correlated with compensation. The result suggests that management 
efEciency to generate sales by using total assets, high coverage ability by ample 
EBITDA, and Erm size positively aEect CEO cash compensation in the hotel sector. And 
the posiEvely signiEcant coefEcient of dummy suggests that hotel Erms offenng stock 
options tend to pay cash high cash compensation as well.
SR. and LTD were negatively correlated with compensaEon. As expected in the 
hypothesis, the negaEve correlation between LTD and cash compensaEon was identiEed. 
According to Jensen (1986), debt leverage is regarded as a mechanism for controlling 
agency cost related to free cash Eow. With high debt leverage, the default risk may deter 
a Erm Eom lavishing cash on executive pay and perks.
This study did not End evidence, however, to support Endings of previous studies that 
the Erm's market return is positively correlated with compensaEon. The result of 
negaEve coefEcient of SR indicates hotel Erms pay high cash compensaEons despite poor 
market performance of their stocks. This surpnsing Ending was also evidenced by real 
examples of Trump Hotel and Host MarrioE CorporaEon, as discussed in Chapter 4.
These results indicate that a high degree of agency problem may exist within the hotel 
sector. Hotel CEOs may be pursuing high cash compensaEons to increase their own 
wealth, and disregarding wealth decline for hotel shareholders themselves. Therefore, 
senous conEicting interests between management and shareholders may exist in the hotel 
sector.
Since the purpose of this study is to establish a model to identify determinants of CEO 
cash compensation, the model's explanatory power is important. The result demonstrated
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the adjusted R Square of 0.756. which means that 75.6% of the variance in hotel CEO 
cash compensation is explained by six variables identiEed in the model.
As to the DW test, dummy vanables were added in an attempt to control tor the 
possible impact of Eme series on the senal residual correlation, as indicated by a DW  
value of 1.381, but the DW  value did not increase. Therefore, autocorrelation may be a 
problem in the model of the hotel sector.
Casino
Using backward elimination procedure, six variables Eom the onginal list of ten were 
incorporated into the model for the casino sector. These identiEed determinants of 
compensaEon were QR; IC; ROA; ATT; TA, and dummy. Except for ATT and IC. four 
variables were posiEvely correlated with compensaEon. The result suggests that 
proEtability, liquidity and firm size positively affect CEO cash compensation. High 
sensiEvity to a Erm's liquidity indicates that the more ability to pay short-term liabilities 
a company has, the more cash compensaEon is paid. This interesEng empirical evidence 
may reEect a general tendency of high QR in the casino sector. The absence of SR in the 
model reveals the casino sector's insensibility to market performance in the 
determinaEon of CEO cash compensation.
As in the hotel sector, the signiEcant coefEcient of dummy suggests that casino Erms 
offenng stock opEons tend to pay high cash compensation, too. The surpnsing result that 
low ATT is associated with high CEO compensation was explained by recent increases in 
total assets in the casino sector, due to openings of many new mega casinos resorts; that 
is, increases in total assets outpaced total sales. While posiEve correlaEon between 1C 
and compensation was expected, the opposing result was presented in the model.
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indicating that Erms with higher IC tend to give less cash compensation. This result may 
be explained by casino Erms' desire to maintain a high ability of servicing debt. The 
desire may have deterred Erms Eom giving extravagant cash bonuses or salaries.
The overall regression results are good. The adjusted R Square of 0.727 indicates a 
high proportion of explained variance to the total vanance of the dependent variable; that 
is, 72.7% of CEO cash compensaEon is explained by Eiur variables identiEed in the 
model.
As to the DW  test, dummy variables were added in an attempt to conEol E)r the 
possible impact of time senes on the senal residual correlation, as indicated by a DW  
value of 1.459, but the DW  value did not increase. Therefore, autocorrelation may be a 
problem in the model of the casino sector.
Restaurant
Using backward elimination procedure, three variables Eom the onginal list of ten 
were incorporated into the model E r the restaurant sector. These identiEed determinants 
of compensaEon were: SR; LTD, and TA. Except for LTD, two vanables were positively 
conelated with compensation. The result suggests that market performance and Erm 
size posiEvely affect CEO cash compensation in the restaurant sector. This Ending is 
consistent with previous studies that found a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and market performance and Erm size. The result of negaEve coefEcient 
of LTD as expected in its alternative hypothesis indicates that restaurant Erms tend to pay 
less if  Erms' capital structure relies more on borrowed funds and vice versa. High 
sensitivity of restaurant CEO cash compensation to debt leverage supports the Ending of
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the study conducted by Jensen (1986) that debt leverage is regarded to be a mechanism 
lor conEolling agency cost related to Eee cash Eow.
The result demonsEated the adjusted R Square of 0.697. which means that 69.7% of 
CEO cash compensaEon is explained by three variables identiEed in the model.
However, regarding the DW test to check senally correlated residuals, the value of DW  
was found to be comparatively low at 1.034. Dummy vanables were added in an aEempt 
to conEol E»r the possible impact of time series on the senal residual correlation; 
however, the DW value did not increase, suggesEng autocorrelation is a problem in the 
model of the restaurant sector.
Implications of the Study 
Based on the Endings, this study oEers E)ur impoEant implications E)r the hospitality 
industry. First, the results of regression analysis at least partially suppoE agency theory 
in the hotel, casino and restaurant sectors by demonsEating that Erm perErmance (ATT; 
ROA and SR respectively) is highly correlated with CEO compensation with the high- 
adjusted R Square of .756, .727, and .697 respectively. Compared to the adjusted R 
squares found in previous studies, this study shows a much higher explanatory power. 
Here are some examples. Ueng (2000) found the adjusted R Square of .2440 for small 
Erms and .2132 for pooled firms. Attaway (2000) found the adjusted R Square of .2928 
for the computer and elecEonics industry. Joyce (2001) showed the adjusted R square of 
.41 for publicly traded banks and savings.
Second, the negaEve correlaEon between cash compensation and LTD found in the 
hotel and restaurant sectors demonstrate their high sensiEvity to a Erm's leverage
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condition. According to Jensen (1986), debt leverage is regarded to be a mechanism for 
controlling agency cost related to Eee cash Eow. With high debt leverage, the default risk 
may deter a Erm Eom lavishing cash on executive pays and perks. Therefore, using 
debts may help in reducing agency problem by providing ample compensation in the 
hotel and restaurant sectors.
Third, in that the hotel sector is a Exed asset intensive industry, ATT is expected to 
have an impact on CEO compensation in the selecEon of variables because ATT 
measures management's efEciency of uElizing total assets including Exed assets. As 
expected, the hotel sector shows posiEvely signiEcant correlation between CEO cash 
compensation and management efEciency (ATT) at the .001 level; this may suggest that 
hotel CEOs with high cash compensaEon are more likely sales revenue than proEt- 
onented. Therefore, raising cash compensaEon may motivate CEOs to maximize sales 
revenue.
Fourth, this study found the indication of agency problem in the hotel sector by the 
negative coefEcient of SR, illustrating that hotel Erms pay high compensation despite 
poor market performance of their stocks. This surpnsing Ending was also evidenced by 
real examples in Chapter 4. Hotel CEOs may be pursuing high cash compensaEon to 
increase their own wealth, disregarding wealth decline for hotel shareholders. There may 
be serious conEicEng interests between management and shareholders in this sector.
Suggestions for Future Study 
For future study of CEO compensaEon and Erm performance in the hospitality 
industry, six points are discussed below. First, one limitation of this study is that its
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sample was drawn Eom a population of publicly traded Erms only. Findings could differ 
if  the sample size were expanded to include pnvately held companies.
Second, in addition to Erm performance variables. CEO-related non-Enancial factors 
need to be included in future studies, since CEO compensation is also accounted for by 
non-Enancial factors. These may include age, job tenure, ownership, and education. By 
accounting for these other effects, future studies will sEengthen the test of compensation 
study.
Third, this study did not investigate deferred forms of compensation, such as stock 
options and other long deferred forms of compensaEon. Although previous studies 
(Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970) have shown cash compensaEon an acceptable substitute 
for more comprehensive measures of composition, this may not be true in the hospitality 
industry due to changes in compensation practices. A more comprehensive measure of 
compensation, such as stock opEons, pension beneEts, stock bonuses. proEt sharing, and 
deferred pay could provide valuable insight into factors in the determination of CEO 
compensation.
Fourth, according to Kefgen &  Mahoney (1998), there conEnues to be a wide 
disparity of composiEon levels for executives, depending on the type, class, size and 
geographical location of their hotel properEes. Therefore, an analysis for hotel Erms 
grouped by type, class, size and geographical location would provide better insight into 
executive compensation within the hotel sector.
FiEh. as discussed in Chapter 4, the overall sectors show somewhat high variation in 
terms of Erm size. In parEcular, the restaurant sector reports that the largest is 4,921.5 
times larger than the smallest. Even within the same sector, the effect of compensaEon
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on firm performance and determinants of compensation may not indicate a consistent 
result according to firm size. Therefore, an analysis for firms grouped by size within the 
same sector could provide better insights about the effects of cash compensation on firm 
performance and sector-specific determinants of compensation.
Sixth, this study focuses on CEO cash compensation only. Since the hospitalit}' 
industry is a labor-intensive industry, it would be interesting to expand the scope to 
include senior executives, and the middle and low-level managers in charge of daily 
operations. By expanding the scope of management level, the study could compare the 
impact of cash compensation of each level of managers on firm performance to see which 
level of management is best motivated to improve firm performance by offering 
compensation. Also, the study could examine whether there are differences in terms of 
factors in the determination of compensation by level of management.
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